Berlin, Freitag, 15. Februar 1957

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Geheimdokument Rockefellers

Vertrauliches Schreiben des Standard-Oil-Königs an Präsident Eisenhower Zynischer Plan der USA-Weltherrschaftsziele

Das Rezept: "Wirtschaftshilfe"—wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit—politische Beherrschung — Militärpakte — Blutzoll der Völker für die USA Ungeheuerliches Zeugnis imperialistischer Unmenschlichkeit

CPYRGHT

Berlin, "Neues Deutschland" ist in der Lage, heute unserem Volko nd der Weltöffentlichkeit den authentischen Text eines geheimen chreibens zur Kenntnis zu bringen, das der Erbe des größten amerikaischen Ültrusts, Standard Oli Corparation, Ne 1s on A. Ro ek ef eller, m Januar 1959 an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Stanten von Nordmerika, Dwight D. Eisenhuwer, gerichtet hat. Der Text, der uns in nglischer Originalinssung und in vollem Wortlaut vorliegt, stammt aus iner unbedingt zuverlässigen Quelle.

Der anterikanische Uffinitäten Kongering, wie die unabhängigen Länder in der ganzen Welt sowie die Kolonien der allen Koloniande Länder in der ganzen Welt sowie die Kolonien der allen Koloniande Kroßebritannien, Frankreich, Portugal, Belgign und Holtand über "Wirtschaftshille", wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit, gölitische Abhängigkeit und Fesselung durch Millitärpakte unter annerikanische Kontrolle serbracht und in Kriege für annerikanische Interessen gestürzt werden sollen. Rockeieller legt in dem Geheindoßument dar, wie dieses Rezept bereilt. in Westeuropa mit Hilfe des Marshallplans "unter Anwendung jeglicher Art von Drack" zur Schaftung des NATO-Krieg-paktes geführt hat. Sensationell ist die offenherzige Schilderung des annerikanischen Monopol-herren, daß das annerikanische Antiemninischrum unter der Leitung von John Foster Dulles mit Hilfe des SEATO-Paktes beabsichtigte, einen Krieg gegen die Vollasepublik China zu provozieren. Das Bokument enthültt die Herschaft des amerikanischen Monopol-kupitals im Iran. Dazu bemerkt Bockefeller: "Gegenwärig würde es der Schah noch nicht einmal wagen, Irgendweiche Veränderungen in seinem Köbinett durchzuführen, dine unseren Bolschafter zu konautlieren." Als Pollitik gegenüber Ägspien empfelich Rockefeller, dem Land amerikanische "Hilfe" bei der Durchführung solcher Banvorhaben aufzaträngen, die seim Kristie überseigen "und es afglugh in annerikanische abhängigkeit zu bringen. Rockefeller fährt text; "Ich erachte es als lögisch, dies Art der Zusammenarbeit auf andere Länder auszudehnen." Länder, wie die Türkot, die bereits zuverlissige "entikommunistische" NATO-Regisungen haben, sollen bei der Kreditigeung nach dem Prinzip behandet werden: "Der geangelte Fisch braucht keinen Köder."

In den Kolonien der alten Kolonialmikhete sollen die nationalen Bestre-

ereitung und Organisierung von Imporialistischen Kriegen tun. Aus der Feder des Abkömmlings der blutbefleckten Rockefeller-Dy

Aus der Feder des Abkömmlings der blutbefleckten Rockefeller-Dynas orfährt die Welt das Geheimuls, wie Vülker ihren nationalen Souveräin und Unabhängigkeit beraubt und unter die Botmkfligkeit der US Monopole gebracht werden, damit sie in einem von den USA angezetel. Krieg um die Weltherrschaft die Kastanien aus dem Feuer hoten soll Kein Publizist der demokratischen Presse der Welt hitte eine schonun lossere umd den Zorn der Völker erregendere Darstellung der wah Hintergrinde der Eisenhower-Deltrin geben können als der anteriam Dimagnat selbst.

"Neues Deutschland" tut nur sohne Pflicht im Kampt um den Frie und filtr das Wohl des Volkes, wenn es dieses unanfechtbare Dokum imperialistischer Raub- und Kriegspolitik der Öffentlichkeit in voll Umfange zur Kenntnis bringt.

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Bonn fürchtet Wiedervereinigungs-<u>programm der SED</u>

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Änderung des Adenauer-Kurses **CPYRGHT** ist die Grundfrage

Ernennung Speidels beleidigt Frankreich

Erklärung von Oberstleutnant Natalis Dumez für "Neues Deutschland"

Ubricht sprech des Schiebwert

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Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R001100270012-7

Rockefeller gibt Direktive für Superkolonialismus der USA

suchestehend veronical statements and a lange, and evide in plast-whose authorizations, and in the plast in t Nachstehend veröffentlichen wir den Wortlaut des auf Seite 1 behandelten vertraulichen Schreibens von Nelson A. Rockefeller an Präsident D. Eisenhower vom Januar 1956:

CPYRGHT

Wirtschaftliche "Hille" zicht Militärbündnis nach sich Militärbündnis nach sich In addrew Werten, wir sollten Bellen wir meist die Werte Militärben Seiten unserer Bürdnis herveitelben. Wir sollten Werte Militärbünden werde Militärbünden werden werde

on of these groups.

First of all, we should pick out the comprise with anti-dominist represents friendly to us, which are already bound to the U.S. through the control of the comprise the control of t

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I am reluctant to revert to that lengthy and tiresome discussion which took place in Camp Lavid in connection with my proposal regards bolder program of sid to under-developed countries. However, recent political developments have shown that our discussion was not a sterile one and that the time has now come when I should state some points that have occurred to me which though the, do not pretend to original many all the same be of some help in approaching one of the most important arothers of our foreign policy.

First of all I would like to express my deep satisfaction with the new Bill increasing the allocation for aid to underdeveloped countries. If I am not mistaken the Bill obtained your approval following Sir Anthony adea's visit to asshington. The Bill was well timed, particularly in the light of Ambassador Cooper's recent reports emphasising the catastrophic drop in American prestige in India especially after Mr. Dulles' statement that Portugal should keep Goa.

most important problems of our foreign policy.

I am sorry to have to point out that my arguments in favour of expanding our schools measures were misinterpreted. I have not, and never have had any fundamental differences with the Administration as regards the general line of our foreign policy. I appreciate as much as anybody does the importance of military alliances, but I believe that they call for an approach different from that of the state importance of military serves to the fact that military alliances are headening increasing the convergence of the fact that military alliances are headening increasing the married the convergence of the fact that military are not provided that the military are not provided that the server of the fact that military are not provided that the server of the fact that military are not provided that the server of the fact that military are not provided that the server of the server o Tinces are becoming increases by the built in the beautiful in the beautif

Ausschnitt aus dem vertraulichen Schreiben Rockefellers an Eisenhower

Der amerikanische Ölmilliardär Rockefeller gibt in diese Präsidenten der USA Empfehlungen, wie die unabhängige der ganzen Welt sowie die Kolonien der alten Kolonialn britannien, Frankreich, Portugal, Belgien und Holland über hilfe", wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit, politische Abhängigkeit lung durch Militärpakte unter amerikanische Kontrolle gebe Kriege für amerikanische Interessen gestürzt werden sollen

Rockefeller legt in dem Geheimdokument dar, wie dieses I in Westeuropa mit Hilfe des Marshallplans "unter Anwend Art von Druck" zur Schaffung des NATO-Kriegspaktes gefül sationell ist die offenherzige Schilderung des amerikanisch herren, daß das amerikanische Außenministerium unter der L John Foster Dulles mit Hilfe des SEATO-Paktes beabsicht Krieg gegen die Volksrepublik China zu provozieren.

Das Dokument enthüllt die Herrschaft des amerikanisch kapitals im Iran. Dazu bemerkt Rockefeller: "Gegenwärtig Schah noch nicht einmal wagen, irgendwelche Veränderung Kabinett durchzuführen, ohne unseren Botschafter zu konsult

Als Politik gegenüber Agypten empfiehlt Rockefeller, dem L kanische "Hilfe" bei der Durchführung solcher Bauvorhaben a die seine Kräfte übersteigen und es dedurch in amerikanisch keit zu bringen. Rockefeller fährt fort: "Ich erachte es als Art der Zusammenarbeit auf andere Länder auszudehnen." die Türkei, die bereits zuverlässige "antikommunistische" rungen haben, sollen bei der Kreditgebung nach dem Prinz werden: "Der geangelte Fisch braucht keinen Köder."

In den Kolonien der alten Kolonialmächte sollen die national

Bonn fürchtet Wiedervereinigungsprogramm der SED

(ND). In zunehmendem Bonn Maße wird in westdeutschen bürgerlichen und adenauertreuen Zeitungen gefordert, im Wahlkampf nicht die Frage der Wiedervereinigung zu behandeln. Das Stichwort die CDU-Zeitungen gab das und Klerus-Blatt Christ Deutschlandvorschlägen des Zentralkomitees der SED verlangt es

CPYRGHT

gramm für die Sicherung einer friedlichen Zukunft Deutschlands und die demokratische Wiedervereinigung besitzt. Das ist inzwischen auch vom Ausland her bestätigt worden, nicht zuletzt durch die Botschaft Bulganins an Adenauer. Gerade durch die Konfrontierung

Welt" am 9. Februar, In einem des Brogramms der SFD mit der ausführlichen Kommenta Provien Fall Reichler Zeit und Bundestag vorgetragenen aggressiven Konzep-

Offensive gegen Militar

Beratung des Präsidiums des Nationalrats / Erklärung ein nt

Berlin (ND). Das Präsidium des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front führte am 13. Februar unter Vorsitz von Prof. Dr. Dr. Correns eine Beratung über die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der Nationalen Front durch. Prof. Al-DP78100945R00440027004297 einleitenden Referat grundsätzliche

Loch, Erich Mückenberger, Wilhelm Koenen, Karl Na-mokel und Dr. Dr. Gericke das Wort ergriffen.

Im regen Meinungsaustausch ergab sich die einmütige Auffassung, daß die durch die 30. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED unterbreiteten Vorschläge zum

organisati aller der De publik, gabe stärktei hung guten

CPYRGHT

Abproxed to the grand and the Watshalt Roburt and special methods integrated into one whole, in other words the task is to hitch all our horses in a single team. To illustrate my point of view better I want to attempt some analysis - even if it is a superficial one - of some aspects of our foreign policy as it has been conducted in Jurope and isle.

In aurope we started with economic aid. It is quite possible that without the marshall Plan we would have found it much more difficult to form hito. Shat in fact happened in this case was that a coordinated foreign policy, using every kind of pressure, resulted in the creation of what we hoped was a solid military minon. Even critics within Miro itself say that it suffers from undue emphasis on the military aspects at the expense of the economic factors which played such a big role in its formation.

In Asia our efforts were far less successful. The principal reason for this can, I believe, be clearly stated; the conception of face was too nakedly shown, too much stress was laid on the military spects which we largely ignored the importance of preliminary economic peparation for the alliances we wished to make.

This underestimation of the vital economic aspects on the part of the state Department has led to the creation of JATO and the Baghdad pate of this wise tradition has been that "the Flag follows trade". It spice of this wise tradition has been that "the Flag follows trade". It spice of this wise tradition has been that, "the Flag follows trade". It members of platTo outla went to be, involved in a var against commandation with the US backing China, with the US backing China, with the US backing China, and the process of the process of

MATTION TO THE PARTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR 2. In order to strengthen and, if possible, to broaden these alliances we must draw up a program of economic development extensive shough for us to have in Asia, Africa and other underdeveloped areas a political and military influence as great or greater than that we obtained through the Marshall Plan in Europe. That is why the main flow of our economic allocation. For underdeveloped countries should be channelled through bodies set up to serve our military alliances. should serve to make the alliances themselves more attractive. If hecessary, certain changes in the form of these alliances should be considered.

In other words, wherever possible we should, emphasize the economic aspects of our alliances. We should widely and wisely make use of sconomic aid to those countries which we intend to draw into alliance with us, but we should do it more flexibly and carefully than hitherto. In the past we have sometimes tied up the provision of economic aid with issands to join one or other of our alliances in such a saude manner that many potential allies were almenated. It is necessary for us to act correfully and patently, and in the early stages confine pograelves to securing very modest political concessions in exchange for our economic aid in some exceptional cases - even without any concessions in return.) The way will then be open to us, but at a later stage, to step up both our political price and our military demands .

You seemed to be ruled by these considerations when you agreed to offer economic aid to agypt to help it with the construction of the aswan ram. If the Nasser Government accepts this aid a situation will be erested in which Egypt will inevitably become bogged down in over ambitious construction and will need our support for a long period of
time. I think it logical to extend this type of co-operation to other
countries. And in particular never to forget the theory of cumulativerather than immediate political demands on which it is based.

3. In line with this I suggest that those countries to which economic aid is to be extended, should be divided into three groups, different methods and forms of economic co-operation being applied to eacn of these groups.

First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-communist poremach for Release 200 1/97/28ipc/ArRBP766-09915E80061692760612-through stable long-term militar, agreements. In this case Covernmental subsidies channel for through sould be 1/28 to see the self-see alliances should be considered.

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First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-dommunist Jovernments friendly to us, which are already bound to the U.S. through stable long-term militar, agreements. In this case Joveynmental subsidies and credits may take the form mainly of military appropriations. The hooked fish needs no bait. Here I agree with the State Department, that the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to furkey, might under the allotment of extensive economic

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tate...ive companie aid to all three groups of countries should always be presented as the expression of a sincere and disinterested desire on the part of the US to help and cooperate with them. We cannot afford to economise in ramming home by every propaganda means available to us the disinterested nature of US policy as regards aid to underdeveloped countries. We do not economise on our anti-communist work. Meanwhile our investors, our technical experts, and other specialists should make is their business to penetrate every branch of the national economy of backward countries, and to develop them with due respect for our own interests and encouraging the national ambitions of those native businessmen whose political loyalty is not in doubt.

It seems to me that provided all these recommendations are carried out the result should be not only to strengthen the international position of the US as a whole but would also considerably facilitate the fulfillment of any military tasks that may confront us in the future by strengthening existing military arrangements and breathing new life into them.

I would not have written this letter and I certainly would not have written at such length, if I had not been confident of your sympathy with the ideas expressed here, and if I did not hope that these ideas would help us in shaping our policy along sound lines.